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Abstract 
One  well-documented pattern in  local public finance is that,  in 
comparison  with what  is spent out of  residents'  private income,  a 
disproportionate amount  of the lump-sum  aid received from  higher  levels of 
government  is  used  to  increase  expenditures rather than reduce  local taxes. 
This paper  shows  how  a bureaucratic model  of the type  suggested by Niskanen 
(1971)  can  be  used  to  explain this behavior.  A  test of the model,  using 115 
small  city governments  in  Michigan,  finds that the bureaucratic  model  explains 
capital  expenditures well,  while operating expenditures appear  to be  better 
explained by  the standard median  voter model. 
I.  Introduction 
Early writers in the theory of  public choice recognized  a connection 
between  the outcome  of electoral processes  and  the demands  of  a particular 
consti  tuent--the median  voter  (see  Hotel  1 i  ng  C19291,  Black  11  9481,  and  Bowen 
C19431).  Consistent  with this hypothesis,  later empirical  analysts  (see 
Borcherding and  Deacon  C19721,  Bergstrom and  Goodman  C19731,  and  Inman  C19781) 
showed  that statistically significant  relationships exist between  local 
government  expenditures and  the median  voter's income  and  tax price.  The  median 
voter model,  however,  faces  serious  theoretical and  empirical  challenges.  One 
difficulty is the troubling possibility that the output of  the community  (and 
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the price it  pays  for public goods)  might be  distorted by  inefficiencies created 
by  the government  agencies  that actually produce  public goods.  This possibility 
is  particularly important because  the median  voter model's  chief rival in  the 
public choice  literature is a set of "bureaucratic" theories of  government 
behavior.  In these models,  public bureaus  are  seen  as  exercising monopoly 
control over publicly produced  goods  and  services.  They  use  this monopoly  power 
to  coerce  elected officials into approving larger budgets  at higher  cost per 
unit than would  otherwise occur,  to  enhance  the personal  prestige,  income,  and 
power  of the bureaucrat. 
A  second  problem with the use  of the median  voter model  involves  a 
consequence  of the model  that is consistently refuted by  empirical  tests. 
Bradford and  Oates  (1971)  have  shown  that,  under  a system of majority rule 
voting,  the effects of any  system of  revenue  sharing can  be  duplicated by  a set 
of  grants to  individuals in the community  of the same  amount,  because  the 
crucial median  voter faces  the  same  budget  constraint in  either case. 
Empirically,  this theorem  implies  that increases  in  noncategorical 
grants  to the community,  when  appropriately weighted  by  the median  voter's  tax 
share,  ought  to stimulate the  same  amount  of  spending as  increases  in  his 
income.  In separate  surveys  of the effect of aid on  spending,  Gramlich  (1977) 
and  Fisher  (1982)  note that this equivalence  is  consistently rejected by  the 
data--a lump-sum  aid increase of $1  generates  more  expenditure  than an  income 
increase of  T  dollars.  This phenomenon  has  been  dubbed  the "flypaper  effect", 
since revenue  sharing money  sticks in  the public sector  where it  first  enters 
the community,  instead of being distributed to the private sector  in  the form of 
lower  taxes. 
This paper  shows  how  these  bureaucratic  theories  can  be  used  to  modify 
the median  voter model  to explain flypaper  effects.  The  intuition behind  the 
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results is  quite straightforward:  having additional  private income  alters the 
median  voter's bargaining position with respect  to  local bureaus  in  a way  that 
additional  lump-sum  aid does  not.  Section I1  explains the nature of flypaper 
effects.  Section I11 details the particulars of the model,  beginning with the 
assumptions  on  which it  is  based.  Section  IV  presents  an  empirical  test,  using 
expenditure  data from 115  small  city governments  in  Michigan.  The  article 
concludes  with some  brief comments  about  extensions of the model. 
11.  Flypaper  Effects 
Figure 1,  adapted from Bradford and  Oates  (19711,  illustrates the 
precise meaning  of the flypaper effect.  An  unrestricted grant of amount  A 
pushes  out the median  voter's budget  constraint as  shown,  but leaves  its slope 
unaffected.  Since  this slope is equal  to  the median  voter's  tax  share  (labeled 
TI,  an  income  increase of amount  TA  results in  exactly the same  final budget 
constraint as  that under  the aid increase.  As  long as  the voter's preferences 
are independent of the elements  of  this budget  constraint,  the  same  equilibrium 
expenditure on  public and  private goods  should occur.  In this sense,  the aid 
increase of A  is equivalent,  under  the median  voter model,  to  an  income  increase 
of the amount  TA. 
Another  way  of looking at this result is  that the median  voter,  as  a 
participant in the  local decision-making process,  can  claim some  portion of the 
community's  shared resources  (including  lump-sum  aid from higher  levels of 
government)  as  his own.  If the aid is  used  to  reduce  local  taxes,  he  will 
recieve T times  the lump-sum  aid in  higher after-tax income.  Being the dominant 
actor in  local  politics,  the median  voter can  move  these resources  in  and  out of 
the public sector at will, converting his share of lump-sum  aid to  public 
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expenditure at an  exchange  rate equal  to  his tax  share.  Since  the funds are 
perfectly  fungible,  the value of his "public income"  (TA)  can  simply be  added 
to  his private income  (Y)  to  get his effective income  (Z): 
(1)  Z  =  Y  +  TA. 
It follows that under  the median  voter model: 
(2)  aE/aA  =  CaE/a(TA> 1  Ca(TA>/aAl =  [aE/a(TA) IT =  TtaEIaY), 
where 
E  =  local  government  expenditure. 
In  elasticity terms,  this can  be  rewritten as: 
(3)  &E,A  =  (AT/E)(aE/aY)  =  (AT/E>(E/Y)(Y/E)(aE/aY)  =  (AT/Y>EE,~. 
However,  as  Fisher  (1982)  demonstrates,  these  theoretical equivalences  are,  on 
the whole,  not supported by  the data.  Of the eleven studies  surveyed by 
Fisher,  only one  failed to  find evidence of flypaper effects.  In the case  of 
studies reporting marginal  effects,  the expenditure effect  of lump-sum  aid 
ranged from $0.20  to  $1.60  larger than predicted by  the  theory.  For  those 
studies reporting elasticities,  the expenditure effects were  from zero to  71 
percent  larger than expected.  Moreover,  flypaper effects  results occurred 
across a wide  variety of data sets and  empirical methodologies.  A  survey by 
Gramlich  (1977)  reached  similar conclusions  about  the existence of  flypaper 
effects:  "Whether  half or all the revenue  sharing money  goes  into higher 
expenditures,  however,  at this point all empirical  studies indicate long-run 
responses  appreciably  greater than would be  implied by  the response of 
expenditures  to  changes  in  income  ..."  (see  Gramlich  C19771,  p.  230). 
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111.  A  Bureaucratic  Model  of Local  Public Choice 
A.  Assumptions 
The  model  is  based  upon  four principal assumptions. ' 
(A.1)  Actors  in  the Model.  The  local budget  process  for each public 
good  is  fundamentally  a two-way  struggle between  the city council  and  the 
local  department  (or bureau)  that produces  the  good.2 
(A.2)  Preferences  of the Actors.  The  preferences  of the city council 
as  a whole  are the  same  as  those of the median  voter  in  each  community.  Each 
department  head  is  interested in  maximizing the budget  of his bureau. 
This  specification of the  maximand  of the local department  head  (or 
bureaucrat)  follows Niskanen  (1971).  Niskanen's view  is  that bureaucrats 
value  salary,  the perquisites of office,  and  patronage,  as  well  as  more 
abstract goals  such  as  public reputation and  power  over others,  and  that all 
these  factors are  systematically related to the  size of the department's 
budget. 
(A.3)  Information in  the Model.  The  bureaucrat  possesses  an 
information advantage  over  the  town  council  in  assessing  the  true minimum  cost 
of  producing public goods. 
Council  members  and  department  heads  are not likely to  find  themselves 
on  an  equal  footing with regard to  the  information needed  to  make  budgeting 
decisions.  By  virtue of  his professional  training and  day-to-day  contact with 
the department,  the bureaucrat  has  a distinct advantage over  his sponsors  in 
knowing  both the production function for public goods  (what  inputs are needed 
for a particular level of  output)  and  the minimum  cost at which  inputs may  be 
obtained.  There  is an  incentive for the bureaucrat to conceal  and  distort this 
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requests. 
(A.4)  Relations Among  the Bureaus.  The  department  heads  in  each  city 
behave  as  if production of all public goods  took place under  one  multi-product 
"superbureau". 
B.  A  Utility-Based Niskanen Model 
It is assumed  at the outset that goods  can  be  meaningfully aggregated 
into two  groups.  Good  1  is a composite private good,  and  its price is 
normalized  to  equal  one.  Good  2  is a composite  of the public goods  produced 
by  the  local  bureaus,  and  its  price to  the community  is P,. 
The  bureaucrat's  information advantage  over city council  gives him 
power  over  the city's expenditure decisions.  In  the extreme  case,  which  is 
modeled  here,  the city council  has  no  information whatever  about  the cost of 
public goods,  and  therefore has  no  information about  the effects of  marginal 
changes  in budgets  proposed by  the bureau.  A  risk-averse city council  will 
therefore  tend  to  avoid making  changes  in the bureau's  budget.  This 
uncertainty about marginal  changes  is compounded  by  strategic behavior on  the 
part of the bureau;  the bureaucrat  reacts to  cuts  in  the budget  by  eliminating 
the most  popular programs  first.  Since  risk-aversion and  strategic bureau 
behavior make  marginal  changes  unpalatable,  the city council  is reduced  to  a 
binary choice between  two  choices  about  which it  is certain:  either accept 
the bureau's budget  in  its entirety,  or do  without the bureau  altogether. 
This weakness  on  the part of city council  allows  the bureaucrat  in 
this model  to  maximize  his budget  subject to  two constraints:  revenues must 
cover  costs,  and  the median  voter must  not be  put in  a position where  he  could 
improve  his lot by  eliminating the bureau  entirely.  Whatever  the next best 
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alternative to  bureau production might be,  it  is  associated with a particular 
utility level  for the median  voter,  which  I  will label UX.  In  order  to 
ensure  its survival,  then,  the aggregate bureau must  not push  the median 
voter's utility level below  UX. 
Algebraically, it  is easy  to show  that,  under  this model,  the 
fol lowing equality is always  satisfied: 
(4)  A  +  (Y-fCX2,  Uxl)/T =  c(X2) 
where: 
A  =  lump  sum  grants  to  the city, 
c(X2) =  the true cost function  for X2, 
T  =  median  voter's tax  share, 
XI  =  f(X2,  UX),  the equation for the median  voter's 
indifference curve  at utility level UX,  and 
Y  =  median  voter's private income. 
To  demonstrate  this point,  note that the following three conditions must  be 
satisfied: 
a)  Y +  TA  =  XI  +  TP2X2 (median  voter budget  constraint), 
b)  P2X2 =  c(X2)  (cost constraint),  and 
C)  UX  =  U(X,,  X2) (utility con~traint).~ 
Since  utility is  monotonic  in  XI,  condition c can  be  inverted to get 
XI  =  f(X2,UX).  We  can  substitute for XI  in  condition a,  and  when 
this is rearranged,  the formula for P2 emerges: 
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Substituting this into the cost constraint  (b)  yields equation  (4). 
The  top panel  of  figure 2  illustrates the geometry  of  equation  (41, 
whi 1  e  a1 so  demonstrati  ng  an  additional necessary  condi tion for maximi  zation in 
the model.  Not  only must  the total revenue  and  total cost curves  intersect, 
but the total revenue  function must  cut through the total cost function  from 
below.  Under  normal  circumstances,  the total revenue  function, 
TR  =  A  +  (Y -  f[X2,  U:I)/T,  is a hyperbola thqt is asymptotic to  the 
dollar axis and  the line TR  =  YIT +  A.  For  the case  of constant marginal 
cost, it  cuts  the total cost  line in two  places,  but only the second 
intersection maximizes  the budget.  Formally,  -f,/T  (the  slope of the TR 
1 ine,  where  f,  represents  the derivative of f  with respect to  its  first 
argument)  must  be  less  than  c1(X2)  (the  slope of the TC  line).  Otherwise, 
the bureau  should be  able to expand  further,  since additional output wilT 
cover  its  costs. 
The  bottom half of figure 2  compares  the outcome  of this bureaucratic 
model  to  the median  voter model  for the case  of  constant marginal  costs. 
Equation  (5) describes  the locus of  all points in the  (P2, XZ) space  that 
give the median  voter utility level  U:.  Although Niskanen  calls this 
locus  the "marginal  value function,"  and  Patinkin (in another  context)  call  s 
it  the "all-or-none" demand  curve (Patinkin  1963,  pp.  83-8>, I  will use  the 
term average benefit (AB)  curve.  As  my  terminology  implies  (and  despite 
Niskanen's  imprecise use  of the term marginal  in this context),  this AB  curve 
is  related to the Hicksian demand  (or marginal  benefit) functiorl as  average  is 
related to  marginal.  Total  revenue  (P2X2) at any  point on  this AB  curve 
will always  be  equal  to  the area under  the corresponding Hicksian demand  curve. 
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Fig. 2 Budget-Maximizing and Median Voter'Models Compared 
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The  AB  curve  should not be  confused with more  common  kinds of  demand 
curves  in  economics,  such  as  the Hicksian and  Marshallian (or ordinary)  demand 
curves.  In the spirit of  binary choice just described,  the AB  curve does  not 
assume  that the consumer  adjusts his purchases  to  maximize  his welfare. 
Rather,  for every given P2,  the curve relates how  much  total output the 
bureau  can  force the consumer  to accept and pay for before the consumer 
decides  to  abandon  the bureau entirely.  The  curve  slopes  downward  because  the 
consumer-voter  will allow a little  more  allocative inefficiency (i.e.,  he  is 
forced to  buy  more  goods  than he  would like at the prevailing price)  in 
exchange  for a little  less productive  inefficiency (i.e.,  a price closer to 
true cost). 
As  figure 2  shows,  output under  the budget-maximizing model  is 
allocatively,  but not productively,  inefficient from the viewpoint of the 
median  voter.  The  median  voter model  dictates output XTv  at the 
intersection of the marginal  cost and  ordinary demand  curves;  the bureaucratic 
model  predicts output X:  at the  intersection of the average  cost and  AB 
curves.  Output  is  produced at cost (so c(X,)  =  E,  where  E  =  expenditures), 
but relative to  the median  voter case  too many  units of  public goods  are 
produced,  and  the bureau's budget  is too large. 
The  Niskanen model  has  two  well-known comparative  static results: 
first, output is  always  cost-elastic;  and  second,  a $1  increase in 
lump-sum  aid will generate more  than a $1  increase  in  expenditures  (for proofs 
in  the context of the current formulation of  the model,  see  Wyckoff  [19841). 
Here I  concentrate on a new  implication of the model  in  the local government 
case:  its  generation of  flypaper effects.  Loosely put,  these occur because 
the extra private income  is "transportable" to the median  voter's next best 
alternative in  a way  that aid is  not.  Or  to  put it  another  way,  the private 
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income  is  fungible,  so  that it  can  be  used  in  alternative situations,  while 
the aid is  not. 
In the most  common  situation,  the voter's next best alternative  is  to 
move  to  a new  city.  If he  moves,  the voter can  utilize his extra private 
income  in this new  situation,  but he  cannot  take his share  of aid to the new 
location -- it  is tied to  his current city of re~idence.~  Since  aid is  not 
available in  the median  voter's -next  best alternative situation,  increases  in 
aid fail to increase Uz,  but increases  in  private income  undoubtedly do 
change  that value.  The  increase in  U:  helps  to  restrain the growth of 
spending by  the bureaucrat  in the case  of higher  private income  but not in  the 
case  of increases  in  aid.  This  is  the  source of flypaper effects. 
In  more  intuitive terms,  private income  increases  improve  the voter's 
bargaining position in  budget  discussions,  but increases in  aid do  not.  As  an 
analogy,  note  that the outcome  of negotiations between management  and  labor 
often depend  upon  the suffering each  side will endure if no  agreement  is 
reached.  If management  can  demonstrate  that it  is  not unduly harmed  by  the 
shutdown  of its  facilities (that is,  its U;  is high) it  can  often take a 
tougher  negotiating stance  and  force concessions  from the workers. 
The  reader may  also see  parallels here  with the papers  by  Romer  and 
Rosenthal  (1980)  and  Filimon,  Romer,  and  Rosenthal  (19821,  where  it  was  shown 
that, if the state imposes  a "reversion level" on  the decisions of a 
budget-maximizing school  board--a  level of taxes  and  expenditures  that would 
prevail if voters failed to  approve  the district's tax  levy--spending outcomes 
can  be  affected by  any  change  that occurs  in  that reversion level.  Here, 
Uz  amounts  to a "natural" reversion level,  not imposed  by  the  state,  but 
by  the circumstances  faced by  the median  voter.  An  increase  in  income 
increases  the utility  of this reversion level and  forces the bureau  to 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copy-1 3- 
restrain its  budget  demands,  while the aid increase does  not.' 
To  prove  this proposition,  note that,  as  long as  the cost function 
C =  c(X2)  is  monotonic,  there exists an  inverse function X2 =  g(C),  which 
maps  cost into a unique  level of  output.  Then  the Niskanen  model  can  be 
characterized by: 
(6)  C =  A +  (Y  - fCg(C),  U;I)/T. 
Therefore: 
(7  1  ac/aA  =  1 -  (flgl/T)ac/aA. 
But,  since g is an  inverse function,  g' =  l/cl.  Substitution and 
rearrangement  result in: 
(8)  ac/a~  = i/(i  +  ~,/TcI).  / 
This means  that: 
With respect to  y,  differentiation of  equation  (4)  can  be  performed  in  exactly 
the same  fashion as  was  used  to  establish aC/aA.  This time,  however,  the 
dependence  of  U;  on  Y must  be  considered.  When  the results are 
rearranged,  this yields: 
where 
f2  =  af(x2  ,u;)/au;. 
Since f2  and  aU;/aY  are both positive,  -f2aU;/aY  reduces 
the size of the numerator  in this last equation.  The  result from figure 2 
that -fl/T  <  c'(X,)  ensures  that the denominator  is  positive.  Hence,  a 
comparison of (9)  and  (10)  shows  that: 
aE/aTA  =  aC/aTA  <  aC/aY  =  aE/aY. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copy-1  4- 
IV.  An  Empirical  Test of the Model 
A.  Addi tional Assumptions 
To  test the model  just described,  four addi tional assumptions  are 
made.  All of these assumptions  are more  or less standard  in  the literature on 
testing the median  voter model  (see,  for example,  Borcherding  and  Deacon 
[I9721 and  Bergstrom and  Goodman  C19731). 
(A.5)  The  cost function for  production of public facilities exhibits 
constant marginal  and  average  costs.  The  cost of another  unit of  facilities 
may  vary across  jurisdictions,  but it  does  not vary with the level of  output 
in  any  particular jurisdiction. 
(A.6)  Units of  public facilities and  units of  public services  are 
related by  the following "sharing function": 
where 
XL =  the quantity of local public services provided, 
Xi  =  the quantity of local public facilities provided, 
n =  the population of  the city, and 
a =  a crowding parameter  (to be  determined by  the data), 
which equals  zero when  local  pub1  ic goods  are pure 
public goods  and  1  when  they are pure private goods. 
This  specification allows local public goods  to  be  "impure." 
(A.7)  The  median  voter is  part of the household  with median  family 
i  ncome  for the commun i  ty  . 
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(A.8)  The  median  voter owns  the house  with median  value  for the city, 
and  this constitutes his entire holding of taxable property.  Also,  the median 
voter bears  no  part of the taxes paid by  business  firms in  the c~mmunity.~ 
To  justify assumptions  (A.7)  and  (A.8),  a  log-linear functional  form 
is employed,  and  the results derived by  Bergstrom and  Goodman  (1973)  are 
utilized.  These  results are designed to  deal  with the problem that the median 
voter-median  income  correspondence may  be  broken by  factors that cause  the 
demand  for local public goods  to  be  a non-monotonic  function of income. 
Bergstrom and  Goodman  show  that,  as  long as  the distribution of incomes  within 
each  subgroup  having  distinct demands  (i.e.,  homeowners  and  renters)  is 
proportional across  cities, median  quantity demanded  will be  a  log-linear 
function of  median  income  in  each  city and  the proportion of  citizens 
belonging  to  each  group  (see  Bergstrom and  Goodman  C19731 pp.  295-6).  The 
Bergstrom and  Goodman  methodology  is followed in this paper  by  including 
percentage  owner-occupied,  percentage  nonwhite,  and  percentage  aged  65  and 
over among  the independent  variables in the estimating equation. 
B.  Estimated Equation and  Test Procedures 
The  following functional  form was  used  in testing the model: 
(11)  In  E, =  bo +  b,  In  POP,  +  b,  In  TI  +  b3 In  Z, 
b4 In  INCRATIO,  +  bs In  OTHERAID,  +  b6 DENSITY, 
+  b7  PEROWN  i  +  be  PERNONW  1  +  bs  PER65AO I  +  E 1 , 
where 
El =  expenditures on  all functions except  utilities (water, 
electricity,  gas,  and  transit systems)  and  health (including 
hospitals) for the fiscal year ending between  July 1,  1976, 
and  June  30,  1977; 
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TI  =  tax share of  the median  voter.  TI  equals median  house 
value,  1970,  divided by 2  times  state equalized valuation 
for the community,  1970  (in Michigan,  state equalized 
valuation is set at  one-half of the true cash  value of 
property); 
total income  of the median  voter,  both public and  private; 
ZI =  median  family income,  1970 +  TI  *  REVSHARE,. 
REVSHARE,  =  the total amount  of  state and  federal revenue 
sharing received by the community.  REVSHARE[ 
includes  a1  1 aid given for general  local 
government  support (for example,  distributions 
from the state sales  tax),  but not money  granted 
for specific categories of  expenditure (for 
example,  money  from state gasoline  taxes  that are 
earmarked  for street and  highway expenditures). 
INCRATIOI  =  the proportion of Z  provided by revenue  sharing. 
INCRATIOI  =  TI  *  REVSHAREIIZI; 
OTHERAID,  =  non-revenue sharing aid received by  the community; 
DENSITY,  =  density of  the city,  given by POP,  divided by  land 
area in  square miles; 
PEROWN,  =  percentage of  occupied residences  in  the city that are 
owner-occupied,  1970; 
PERNONWI  =  percentage of  population  that is  nonwhite,  1970; 
PER65AOI  =  percentage  of  population age  65  and over,  1970,  and 
EI is  an  independently and  identically distributed disturbance 
term with zero mean  and  finite variance.The  error term reflects 
four random  elements  in  the model: 
1)  errors on  the part of  the bureaucrat in  perception of  the 
demands  of the median  voter because  his knowledge  of  these 
demands i  s  imperfect , 
2)  differences in tastes and  preferences among  median  voters 
because  the voter's demands  are not uniquely determined by his 
income,  tax share,  and  the features of  his community, 
3)  errors due  to  the uneven  distribution of  capital outlays, 
since capital  spending,  rather than the true value of 
depreciation,  is included in  expenditures,  and 
4)  differences  in  the true cost of  producing public goods 
across  communities,  which may  affect both the demand  of the 
median  voter and.  the pri  ce  charged for city services  . 
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The  existence of  bureaucratic power  in  city expenditure decisions was 
tested using a two-part methodology  involving the parameters  bl  and  b4. 
The  importance of b,  hinges on  the unusual  role of  the variable POP  in  the 
empirical  specification just described.  Population has  no place in  the model 
per  se;  its  only role is in  affecting the cost of  producing public services. 
Let co  be  the cost of  producing a unit of  public facilities, while cl  is 
the cost of  producing a unit of  public services.  Using assumptions  (A.5)  and 
(A.61,  we  have  that: 
(12)  c,  =  ac,(X,)  =  ac,  (X,)  axf =  co,n
a 
ax,  ax:  ax, 
Let 6  be  the city's cost elasticity of  expenditure on public goods.  Then, 
the price component  of the estimating equation would  theoretically be: 
(13)  6 In ell  =  6 In  coln
a  =  6 In  coi +  6a  In  n. 
If  the unobservable col are randomly distributed and  independent  of  the 
other variables on the right-hand side,  we  can  follow Bergstrom and  Goodman  in 
characterizing 6 In  coi as  simply an  additional component  of the error 
term EI.  The  term 6a  In  n,  on  the other hand,  corresponds  to the term 
bl  In  POP,  in (11);  therefore,  bl =  6a. 
Under  the null hypothesis (the median  voter model),  6 has  no 
restriction;  the cost elasticity of expenditure can  be  anything at all.  Hence 
there are also no restrictions on  b,  .  On  the other hand,  the Niskanen  model 
is  characterized by  cost elastic demand,  which results in  an  inverse 
relationship between  cost per unit and  expenditure.  Therefore,  under  these 
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alternatives,  6 <  0.  Since  O~ail  by assumption,  this model  requires 
that b,  =  6a (  0. 
Variable  Z  above  is simply the total income  of the median  voter under 
the Bradford-Oates theorem  that one  dollar of lump  sum  aid is equivalent  to  T 
dollar's worth of income.  The  variable INCRATIO  puts  this theorem to the 
test; if the median  voter paradigm holds,  the composition of this income 
between  grants and  private income  shouldn't matter,  and  b4 =  0.  Under  the 
Niskanen  theory,  expenditure  should rise with the proportion of Z  that comes 
from  revenue  sharing,  so  b4 is greater than zero. 
Our  sample  consists of  115  cities in  Michigan with 1970  populations 
between  2,500  and  57,000,  located outside the southeast  corner of the state 
(Wayne,  Oak1  and,  and  Macomb  counties) . '  The  data for these  communities 
came  from the 1970  Censuses  of Population and  Housing,  the 1977  Census  of 
Governments,  and  from publications of  the Michigan State Tax  Commission. 
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Variable  Parameter  Estimate  Std.  error 
INTERCEPT  b  o  -1.291  2.002 
In  POP  b I  0.482  0.104 
In  T  b  z  -0.341  0.098 
In  Z  b  3  0.757  0.234 
In  INCRATIO  b 4  0.145  0.103 
In  OTHERAID  b  5  0.190  0.040 
DENSITY  b  6  -1 .377E-05  2.649E-05 
PEROWN  b  7  -7.164E-03  3.081 E-03 
PERNONW  be  2.684E-03  3.378E-03 
PER65AO  b  s  1.891 E-02  9.258E-03 











N  =  115 
R-squared:  0.940 
Adjusted R-squared:  0.935 
Marqinal  effects,  evaluated at sample  medians: 
Predicted by theory,  aE1aREVSHARE  =  TaEIaY  =  $0.0198. 
Estimated effect,  BEIBREVSHARE =  $0.5581. 
Error,  $0.5383. 
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C.  Results 
Table 1 shows  the results obtained when  ordinary least squares  is  used 
to  estimate  the equation described above,  using current expenditures only. 
The  variables  in  logs--POP,  T,  Z,  INCRATIO,  OTHERAID--all  have  the signs  that 
might be  anticipated,  given the model  developed above.  Increases  in 
population,  income,  non-revenue-sharing aid,  and  the ratio  of  revenue  sharing 
to  total income  all tend to  increase expenditure,  while increases  in  the tax 
share  tend  to  reduce  spending.  The  overall fit  of the regression appears  to 
be  very good,  as  demonstrated  by a R-squared of 0.940. 
The  results summarized  in table 1  are fairly typical of studies of 
local public choice.  The  estimates of  population,  income,  and  tax share 
elasticities are all within the ranges  set up  by Bergstrom and  Goodman  (1973) 
using separate regressions for each  of  several  states.  As  is  usual  in  the 
literature,  the  income  elasticity is significantly larger than the tax share 
elasticity in  absolute  value.  Although higher than average,  the estimate of 
the effect of  revenue  sharing on  expenditure is  well  within the range  found by 
Fisher  (1982);  likewise,  the estimates  for TaEIaY  are  similar to the 
estimates  summarized  there.  Most  importantly,  however,  the table shows  that, 
with respect  to  current expenditures,  the coefficient on  b,  is  significantly 
different from zero while the coefficient on  b,  is not.  Although the 
descriptive statistics at the bottom of  the table suggest  that flypaper 
effects exist,  these  tests reject the bureaucratic model,  while not rejecting 
the median  voter model. 
Table 2  presents  the results when  the independent  variables described 
above  are used  in  a regression on  capital expenditures  alone  (outlays for 
construction,  equipment,  and  land).  As  would be  expected,  the fit  of the 
equation  is not as  good  for capital expenditures  as  for current expenditures; 
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Variable 
INTERCEPT 
In  POP 
In  T 
In  Z 
In  INCRATIO 
In  OTHERAID 
DENSITY 
Parameter 
b  o 
b  1 
b  2 
b  3 
b  4 
b  5 
b  6 
Estimate 







Std.  error  t-stat  . 
8.563  -1 .439 
0.491  -1.434 
0.498  -2.719 
1.053  1.873 
0.517  2.087 
0.181  3.464 
-1.117E-04  -0.747 
PEROWN  b  7  -8.704E-03  1.309E-02  -0.665 
PERNONW  be  -9.490E-03  1.399E-02  -0.678 
PER65AO  b  s  -5.642E-02  3.963E-02  -1.424 
NOTE:  Ten  of the cities in  the sample  reported no capital expenditures  at 
all.  This presented a  problem,  since the dependent  variable is  the log of 
expenditures.  The  estimates above  result when  these  cities are simply 
omitted;  similar results occur when  capital  spending for the 10 cities is  set 
to some  small  number  (such  as  $1 1. 
N  =  105 
R-squared:  0.665 
Adjusted R-squared:  0.633 
Marginal  effects,  evaluated at sample  medians: 
predicted by theory,  BEIBREVSHARE  =  TBEIBY  =  $0.0055 
estimated effect,  BEIBREVSHARE  =  $0.7479 
error,  $0.7424 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copy-22- 
the R-squared  drops  to  0.665  from its  previous  level of  0.94.  All of  the 
first six parameters  (bo through  bs) are larger in  absolute value  than 
they were  for the regression on  current expenditures--suggesting that capital 
expenditures  are more  sensitive to  the economic  and  financial environment  of 
the city.  Most  importantly,  the tests now  reject the median  voter model  but 
fail to  reject the Niskanen  model,  since b,  is  positive and  significant, 
while b,  turns negative but is not statistically significant. 
The  bottom of table 2  contains additional evidence of  bureaucratic power. 
Under  the median  voter model,  a $1  increase  in  REVSHARE  ought  to  be  equal  to  T 
times  the effect of  a $1  increase in  private income.  However,  evaluated at 
sample  medians,  TBEIBY  equals  $0.0055  while aE1aREVSHARE  equals 
$0.7479.  The  data,  then,  show  that large flypaper effects occur  in  the 
sample.  Moreover,  the restriction under  the budget-maximization model  that 
aE1aREVSHARE  >  1 is  not violated at sample  medians;  adding up  the marginal 
propensities to consume  out of  aid for current and  capital expenditures 
results in  aE1aREVSHARE  =  $1.306. 
These  results suggest  that a dichotomy  exists with respect to  the current 
and  capital expenditure behavior of  local governments.  Although many 
explanations of this effect  are possible, it  seems  plausible that the extra 
complexity of  capital expenditures,  along with their ability to  be  financed 
through debt,  might allow the bureaucrat  to  get more  of what  he  wants  in  this 
case. 
A  word or two of caution ought  to  accompany  this discussion of  results. 
Although  in  the joint test performed  above,  the bureaucratic model  clearly 
dominates  the median  voter model  in  the case of  capital expenditures,  the 
single parameter  b,  is not significantly different from zero.  This raises 
the possibility that another,  competing model  exists that might dominate  the 
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bureaucratic model  by  explaining flypaper effects without imposing the 
constraint that b, 5  0.  It is, however,  difficult to imagine what  that 
model  might be.  It has  been  argued  that flypaper effects occur  because  of 
fiscal illusion (mistaking  the average  cost of public goods  for its  marginal 
cost),  differences  in  the  tax  structures of national  and  subnational 
governments,  improper measurement  of the variables  involved,  and  incorrect 
econometric  specification of the model  (for a review,  see  Fisher  C19821).  In 
general,  however,  these  explanations  do  not fit the current data well,  as  they 
fail to explain the marked  difference in  observed behavior  between  current and 
capital expenditures.  For  example,  if fiscal illusion makes  the  voter believe 
that revenue  sharing lowers  the per unit cost of public goods,  this effect 
ought  to  be  registered in  both kinds of expenditures.  The  bureaucratic model 
constitutes  the best available explanation of the data,  although clearly more 
research is needed  here. 
In this context,  it  should  be  noted  that the dichotomy observed  between 
operating and  capital  expenditures has  been  previously noted in  the 
literature.  Nathan,  Manvel,  and  Calkins  (1975>,  in  their study of the effects 
of  revenue  sharing on  state and  local  governments,  suggest  that in  the first 
few years of the revenue  sharing program,  these  governments  were  concerned 
about  the possibility that these  funds might eventually be  cut off by  the 
federal  government.  For  this reason,  they tended  to  use  this money  for 
one-time capital projects rather than for extra current services  that would 
have  to be  maintained  in  the event  that revenue  sharing was  not renewed. 
However,  although the  suggestion of  Nathan,  Manvel,  and  Calkins helps 
explain why  the city council  might be  particularly willing to  accede  to  the 
bureaucrat's demands  in  the area of capital  expenditures,  it  is  not a complete 
explanation of the patterns observed  in  this paper.  It  does  not explain,  for 
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example,  why  output should be  cost elastic for capital expenditures  (b,  <  0) 
but cost inelastic for operating expenditures  (b,  >  0).  It  does  not account 
for the fact that the total effect of lump-sum  aid is  greater  than the amount 
of the aid itself (aE1BREVSHARE  >  1 for total expenditures)." 
Moreover,  it is  not a complete  explanation of  the observed flypaper effects in 
capital expenditures.  Granted,  that uncertainty about grants might predispose 
council members  toward  capital expenditures  over operating expenditures:  this 
still does  not explain why  council fails to  exercise,its other option to  use 
the aid to  reduce  taxes.  In,short,  this answer  fails to  explain why  aid 
"sticks" in the public sector.  The  model  in this paper  can  help complete  the 
picture. 
IV.  Summary  and  Conclusions 
This paper  has  shown  how  a model  of  the type developed by Niskanen  (1971) 
can  be  used  in  the local government  context to  explain flypaper effects.  An 
empirical  test of  the model  using the expenditures of  115  Michigan cities 
concluded  that the model  explains capital goods  expenditures well,  but that 
operating expenditures  appear  to be  better explained by a median  voter model. 
These  are not logically inconsistent results.  It is  entirely possible that 
the monitoring devices  that city councils use  to  restrain bureaucratic 
discretion (for example,  using stringent budgeting and  expense  reporting 
techniques,  comparing  cost and  output data with those of  other communities, 
and  cultivating "feedback mechanisms" from citizens and  the news  media  to 
gauge  the bureau's  performance)  work  well  in  one  context but not in  another. 
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A natural  extension of the work  in  this paper  would be  to  explore whether 
flypaper effects can  be 'explained  with other kinds of  bureaucratic models. 
This  would  include,  for example,  theories  in  which  the bureaucrat maximizes 
the size of  his staff (Williamson  1965)  or uses  his monopoly  power  to  fund 
perquisites of  office,  such  as  lavish offices,  large expense  accounts,  short 
working hours,  good  fringe benefits,  and  so on  (Alchian and  Kessel  1962).  It 
turns out that these models,  in  which  the bureaucrat maximizes  organizational 
"slack",  also generate flypaper effects,  for  the very same  reason that they 
occur in  the Niskanen model.  The  bureaucrat  extracts greater resources from 
the voter  in  the aid case  (as  compared  to  an  increase  in  private income), 
because  the voter's bargaining position is  relatively weak.  This alternative 
to  bureaucratic production is  not improved by  the aid,  but is improved  by the 
income  increase.  A model  of  this type (and  a demonstration of  flypaper 
effects in this case)  can  be  found  in  Wyckoff  (1984). 
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1.  For  a discussion of the reasonableness  of  these assumptions  in  the context 
of small  Michigan city governments,  see  Wyckoff  (1984). 
2. In  contrast to  the situation at other  levels of  government,  the local 
executive of small-and medium-sized cities is typically a  weak  participant in 
the political process,  in the sense  of  possession of  a  separate  power  base. 
In  Michigan,  for example,  a majority of  cities use  the council-manager  form  of 
government,  with an  appointed chief executive  (see  Michigan Municipal  League 
[19721>.  City managers  in  these  cities serve entirely at the pleasure of the 
council,  and  continued success  in  their careers  (that is, moving  to  better 
positions in  bigger cities) depends  upon  being able to  serve  council member 
"clients" well.  In  the remaining  cities,  the mayor-council form of 
government,  with an  elected executive,  is  used,  but because  of an  historical 
distrust of  strong executives,  the mayor  is seldom given much  power  to  alter 
the allocation of  resources  in  city government  (see  Southern and  Canterbury 
[19641). 
3.  In the case  of  budget-maximizing bureaus,  McGuire,  Coiner,  and  Spancake 
( 1979)  have  theoreti  call  y  exami ned  the uti  1 i  ty benef i  t  s  temmi ng  from the 
presence of  multiple bureaus.  They  find that substitutability of the services 
produced  by  the various bureaus  is crucial  in  pushing the voter's utility 
above  that associated with production by a  single bureau producing all of the 
city's services.  Since  the products of  local government  bureaus  (police and 
fire protection,  parks  and  recreational  services,  etc.)  are not very 
substitutable,  production is treated in  this paper  as if it  occurred under 
one,  a1  1 -encompass i  ng  bureau. 
4.  Formally,  the bureaucrat's problem  is the solution of  the following 
non-linear programming  problem: 
max  P2X2 
P2  9x2 
subject to: 
(1)  Y  +  TA  2  X1  +  TP2X2 
However,  it  is  easy  to  make  a  case  for the equalities,  rather than 
inequalities,  used  above.  Under  normal  circumstances  (i.e.,  as  long as  X, 
has  positive marginal  utility),  the utility-maximizing consumer  will spend  all 
of his income.  As  mentioned  in  the comparative  statics below,  the greater 
than  unit elasticity of the median  voter's demand  curve insures  that the 
budget-maximizing bureaucrat  will lower prices until total revenues  equal 
total cost.  As  will be  revealed in  the discussion of  flypaper effects below, 
the bureaucrat's  budget  is inversely related to  the median  voter's utility, 
and  so  the assumption of  budget-maximization  demands  that U(XI,XP)  be 
driven down  to its  minimum possible  level U;.  Once  these equalities are 
accepted,  the result is the nonlinear programming problem depicted in  figure 2. 
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programs  such  as  revenue  sharing are usually national  in  scope.  Therefore, 
the median  voter is likely to  have  additional aid in  his new,  alternative 
location,  thus raising  his U:.  Even  in  this case,  however,  flypaper 
effects are likely to  occur  because  of  information  costs.  The  voter simply has 
more  certainty about  his own  income  levels than he  does  about aid levels in 
some  alternative location.  It  would be  costly to  obtain this information, 
either directly, by looking at the budgets of  alternative cities, or 
indirectly,  through observation of  each  city's tax and  service levels.  For 
this reason,  both the median  voter and  the council  are likely to  be  more 
assertive in  negotiating with departments if there is  a private income 
increase  than if conditions in  some  alternative city improve. 
6.  Rather  than move,  the voter may  have  the option of  producing the good 
privately or doing without it  entirely,  although (since  we  have  aggregated 
over  all public services) it  is  much  more  difficult to  visualize a city 
dismantling its  entire public sector.  Nevertheless,  this situation also 
dictates that the voter do without the lump-sum  aid he  currently enjoys, 
because  the city faces  the prospect of losing almost all of its  aid from 
higher levels of  government if it  exercises  this alternative.  Effort factors 
are built into revenue  sharing programs  which would  severely  limit  the amount 
a non-taxing government  could receive.  In  Michigan,  a city levying no  taxes 
would be  barred from receiving any  money  from the state's income,  intangibles, 
and  single business  taxes;  similarly,  the federal general  revenue  sharing 
program excludes  non-taxing jurisdictions from receiving much  aid by use  of a 
formula incorporating tax effort  factors,  and  by a provision that limits 
revenue  sharing entitlements to  a fixed percent of  the money  raised by  the 
city from other sources. 
7.  To  avoid confusion here,  the reader  should note  that Romer  and  Rosenthal's 
reversion level  is an  actual  level of public spending,  while the reversion in 
the current model  refers to  a utility level.  For  this reason,  the specifics 
of the  .two models  are entirely different.  Under  the Romer  and  Rosenthal 
model,  for example,  an  increase in  aid increases  the reversion level of 
spending;  in  the current model,  an  increase in  aid does  not affect the 
reversion level of  utility. 
8.  Recently,  two papers  have  appeared  which chal  lenge  this assumption  in  a 
new  and  fundamental  way:  Brown  and  Saks  (1983)  and  Beck  (1984).  Whereas 
Bergstrom and  Goodman  assume  monotonic  individual  demands  and  deal  with the 
problem of  nonmonotonic  aggregate demands,  these  papers  try to  show  that 
individual demands  are nonmonotonic.  The  empirical  work  in  these  papers  tries 
to  establish this nonmonotonicity by including the square of  median  income, 
and  the Gini  index  for the distribution of  family income,  in  a cross-section 
regression on  local expenditures.  The  significance of these  variables was 
tested in  the present study by  including the Gini  coefficient,  the square  of 
median total income  (Z2>, the Gini  coefficient times median  total income, 
and  the Gini  coefficient times  the square  of  median  total income,  in  the 
regressions described below.  The  Gini  index  was  calculated according to  the 
procedures  used  in  Beck  (1984,  p.  60).  None  of these  variables were 
significant at even  the 10  percent  level,  and  an  F-test of  their combined 
significance failed to  reject the hypothesis that they all had  zero 
coefficients at the 10 percent  level. 
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unlikely that the median  voter will be  able,  in  most  instances,  to  isolate the 
complex  effects upon  his budget of the indirect "taxes" (increases  in local 
prices,  etc.)  caused  by business  taxation.  For  this reason,  business  taxes 
were  omitted from the model. 
10.  The  sample  has  been  deliberately restricted to these  cities for several 
reasons.  Cities with populations  below 2,500  could not be  used  because  of  a 
lack of data on median  family income.  Cities with populations  greater than 
57,000  were  not used  because  of  the possibly different nature of  monitoring 
and  budgeting procedures  in  those  cities.  The  cutoff  point of 57,000  was  used 
because,  with respect to  1970  population,  there exists a natural  break  in the 
Michigan city data that falls between  the city of Nyoming  (population 56,560) 
and  the next largest city, Kalamazoo  (population 85,555).  The  suburbs of 
Detroit have  been  eliminated,  because  Goldstein and  Pauly  (1981)  have  shown 
that studies based  upon  the median  voter-median  income  correspondence 
(assumption  A.7)  will be  biased by  the Tiebout process  when  applied to 
metropolitan areas. 
11.  These  difficulties remain even if the arguments  of  Nathan,  et al.,  are 
supplemented  with one  of the alternative flypaper theories mentioned above. 
For  example,  in  the fiscal illusion model,  it  is difficult to show  how 
aE1BREVSHARE  could exceed  one.  Since  aEIBY  is about  $0.02  for  total 
expenditures,  this leaves  about  $0.98  to  be  explained by  the effect of aid on 
the average  (and  perceived marginal)  price of  public goods.  But  a $1  increase 
in aid,  evaluated at sample  medians,  has  only a tiny effect  on  average 
price--a reduction of less than 0.0001  percent. 
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